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In Control
William Simkulet
Abstract: In George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 
cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible 
for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial 
control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but 
this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally 
relevant control over her actions and that none of these are genuine instances of moral luck, 
nor counterexamples to the control principle.
Keywords : ethics; free will; moral responsibility.
Nearly all discussion in the free will debate centers around the control 
principle (CP). According to this principle, one is morally responsible for her 
actions only when she is in control of those actions. Compatibilists and in-
compatibilists disagree about what kind of control CP requires, and whether 
that control is compatible with determinism or indeterminism. The general 
consensus, though, is that the principle is true. In George Sher’s recent article 
“Out of Control”, he challenges this notion. Sher constructs 9 cases that he 
believes demonstrate that moral agents can be morally responsible for some-
thing that is uncontroversially outside of their control. If successful, Sher will 
have demonstrated the falsity of CP. I argue Sher fails, and that in each of these 
cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over those actions she is morally 
responsible for.
1. Introduction
There is a large body of work concerning purported counterexamples to the 
control principle, generally framed as the problem of moral luck.1 In “Moral 
 1  For notable work on in the field, see: Nagel 1976; Williams 1981; Zimmerman 2002 and 2006.
Submitted: July 2013
Accepted: December 2013
60 WIllIAM SIMkuleT 
luck”, Thomas Nagel discusses cases where moral agents are said to be moral-
ly responsible for things outside of their control – instances of moral luck – and 
distinguishes between four kinds of luck: (1) resultant luck – luck in the results 
of one’s actions, (2) circumstantial luck – luck in the circumstances one faces, 
(3) constitutive luck – luck in one’s character traits and genetic makeup, and (4) 
causal luck, or luck in how our actions are caused. Nagel identifies the problem 
of moral causal luck as the problem of free will. These last three kinds of luck 
are often grouped together as cases of situational luck, or luck in the situation 
one finds oneself in. Any prima facie instance of moral resultant or situational 
luck is a prima facie counterexample to CP.
Although Sher contends his enterprise is distinct from Nagel’s in that he 
discusses particular instances where agents lack control, Nagel’s cases are best 
understood as purported examples of moral luck. like most, I believe the con-
trol principle is true. If the control principle is true, then there can be no genu-
ine instances of moral luck – this is to say that in any situation where a moral 
agent appears to be morally responsible for something outside of their control, 
either they are morally responsible for something else that is in their control, 
or they aren’t morally responsible. In each of Sher’s cases, the agents are clearly 
morally responsible for something that I argue is well within their control.
Before examining Sher’s cases in the next section, it will be useful to make 
some terminological distinctions. First, I approach of each of these cases with 
a commonsense account of moral responsibility – an incompatibilist account. 
Outside of offering a defense of the control principle, I do not wish to take 
a stance on the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate over free will. However, 
many of our commonsense notions of moral responsibility are incompatibilist 
notions consistent with an account of moral responsibility where to be morally 
responsible for something is to be the appropriate object of praise or blame in 
virtue of one’s free, authorial relationship to that thing. By free, I mean, rough-
ly, an action that is uncoerced and undetermined; by authorial I mean, roughly, 
deliberate, intentional, and approved. On this account, moral agents are non-
arbitrary first causes of their free actions. If this is the case, it makes sense to 
trace the goodness or badness of their actions back to them, qua agents, rather 
than further back along the causal chain in an infinite regress. Galen Strawson 
calls this true moral responsibility, and in “The Impossibility of Moral Respon-
sibility”, contends that when one is truly morally responsible for something, 
it “makes sense” for one to be rewarded in heaven or punished in hell for that 
something (Strawson 1994). Strawson’s point isn’t religious; rather it is that 
there is something fundamentally wrongheaded with heaping praise or blame 
on things that don’t exert this kind of control over their actions; to berate and 
torture a lemon of an automobile in hell for all of eternity would be absurd 
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where as to berate and torture, say, someone who freely and knowingly mur-
dered several innocent people for fun would not be.
Notably, Strawson contends that compatibilist and incompatibilist alike 
cannot help but believe they possess this awesome, authorial control over their 
actions when making those choices they believe are free, even if those same 
dedicated compatibilists might be able to later review their actions and come 
to the conclusion that they were invariably wholly causally determined by ex-
ternal factors outside of their control to chose as they did.
Strawson believes that this kind of authorial control, and the moral respon-
sibility that follows from it, is impossible. To take this stance, I think, is to 
engage in radical skepticism about our moral beliefs, and to throw out so many 
of our moral intuitions and beliefs that any serious moral inquiry is left unrec-
ognizable. Compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility are something far 
different from our commonsense accounts; the difference between gold and 
iron pyrite.
To illustrate this, contrast our intuitions about the appropriateness of true 
moral responsibility with that of what I call practical responsibility, where to be 
practically responsible for something is to be such that it is practical for others 
to treat one in the same way they would if one was morally responsible for that 
something. For example, we might imprison or exile someone for threatening 
to harm others of their own volition; similarly we might imprison or exile a 
plague victim for fear that she could harm others. While exiling or imprison-
ing both of them is practical, it’s not clear that a plague victim deserves to be 
treated in this manner. 
Robert Merrihew Adam, in “Involuntary Sins”, argues moral agents can 
be morally responsible for vicious actions that are completely causally deter-
mined by vicious character traits, which in turn they could be entirely causally 
determined to have (Adam 1985). This account of moral responsibility is far 
closer to practical responsibility than Galen Strawson’s true moral responsi-
bility, and is inconsistent with our commonsense moral beliefs. Consider the 
following case:
Francine was grown in a vat by scientists, and kept unconscious until she was fully 
physically developed. Scientists then artificially implant vicious character traits into 
her mind – traits that, in some situations, wholly causally determine her to act in a 
prima facie vicious manner. Scientists release Francine into the world, and she encoun-
ters such a situation, and her character traits cause her to act viciously.
According to Adams, Francine is blameworthy for her action despite the 
fact that it was wholly causally determined by something that is outside of her 
control, her character and the circumstances she faces. To use Nagel’s termi-
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nology, Adams believes this is a case of situational moral luck. I contend that it 
is rather absurd to hold Francine morally culpable in such a situation. Contrast 
this case with the following:
Janine1 is a well known and respected medical doctor, and has published several 
papers regarding how addictive smoking is. Her work was recently collected and pub-
lished as a well reviewed book on the subject, and she attends several parties to pro-
mote her book. At once such party, she is offered a cigarette, but rather than politely 
decline, she freely chooses to smoke. After several similar situations, Janine1 awakens 
with a strong nicotine craving, and runs to the store to buy cigarettes. 
While Francine is intuitively not morally responsible for her character, it 
makes sense to say that Janine1 is morally responsible for her addiction. But 
surely this is only the case because Janine1 freely engaged in behavior she be-
lieved would likely bring about her addiction. Suppose Janine2 is kidnapped 
and forced to smoke against her will, which causes her to become addicted. Al-
though both Janine1 and Janine2 are addicted, surely it would be absurd to say 
that Janine2 is morally responsible for her addiction. Now suppose Janine3 acts 
in the same manner as Janine1, but her body never becomes addicted. Surely 
Janine3 is as morally responsible as Janine1; they made the same free choices 
with the same expectations; but it wouldn’t make sense to say that Janine3 is 
morally responsible for her addiction because she’s not addicted!
To the extent that Janine1 and Janine3 are equally morally responsible, it 
makes sense to say that they are morally responsible for the same things. Ja-
nine3 is truly morally responsible for acting in a manner in which she believes 
would have harmful consequences; as is Janine1. But it also makes sense to say 
that Janine1 is responsible for something else – she’s also responsible for her 
addiction. In “ Taking luck Seriously”, Michael Zimmerman offers a possible 
explanation; he contends that Janine1 and Janine3 are morally responsible to 
the same degree, but that they each have a different scope – Janine1 is morally 
responsible for more things than Janine3 – she is responsible for her free choices 
and their results; while Janine3 is only morally responsible for her free choices. 
The problem with Zimmerman’s analysis is that Janine’s purported moral re-
sponsibility for her addiction contributes to her degree of blameworthiness in 
the same manner as Janine2’s – not at all. To say that Janine1 is morally blame-
worthy for her addiction is empty.
An alternate explanation for Janine1’s purported blameworthiness for her 
addiction is that she is only derivatively morally responsible for it, where to be 
derivatively morally responsible for something y is to be truly morally respon-
sible for something x, where x is connected to y in an appropriate way. It makes 
sense to say that Janine1 is (derivatively) morally responsible for her addiction 
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because she is truly morally responsible for her free choice to smoke, which she 
had good reason to believe would bring about an undesirable addiction. This 
is the same thing that Janine3 is morally responsible for. Whether or not Janine1 
ultimately became addicted is outside of her control, a matter of resultant luck. 
However, on this analysis, this luck is not genuine moral luck. What this view 
lacks in superficial compatibility with our commonsense linguistic practices, it 
more than makes up for in terms of consistency with our conception of moral 
responsibility as concerning praise and blame, not to mention consistency with 
the control principle and how we actually judge persons.2
2. Nine Cases
Sher constructs 9 cases in which he believes agents are uncontroversially 
morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (285). He cat-
egorizes them into three groups of three: (1-3) lapses of attention, (4-6) bad 
judgment, and (7-9) moral ignorance. Sher contends that what these agents are 
morally responsible for is outside of their control; however here I contend that 
what these agents are truly morally responsible for is well within their control.
2.1 Case Group (1-3) – lapses of Attention
In each of these cases, Sher believes the agent is morally blameworthy for 
their lapse of attention, despite lacking control over it. While it strikes me that 
we probably exert some relevant control over our attention, and lapses in it, I 
contend that the wrong-making feature of each of these cases has nothing to 
do with a lapse in attention.
1. Hot Dog – Alessandra, with her dog Bathsheba in the back of her van, leaves to 
pick up her children from school as usual. In the past, the pickup has never taken 
long, and Alessandra leaves the dog in the van. While picking up her children, 
Alessandra is distracted by a school matter for several hours, and forgets the dog. 
When her family returns to the car, the dog is unconscious from heat prostration.
2. On the Rocks – Ferry pilot Julian is 40 minutes into a trip he is very familiar with, 
and knows to look out for submerged rocks. “However, just because the trip is 
so routine, Julian’s thoughts have wandered to the previous evening’s pleasant 
 2  If we were to learn that Janine did not actually expected to become addicted, perhaps because 
she had trustworthy evidence that the link between smoking and addiction was a vast conspiracy, 
surely we would revise our moral intuitions about her blameworthiness for her own addiction... al-
though we might raise concerns about whether she was justified in holding such a bizarre position. 
For another example of how we revise our judgments in light of unexpected, but morally relevant 
manners; see Simkulet 2012.
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romantic encounter. Too late, he realizes that he no longer has time to maneuver 
the ferry” (297).
3. Caught off Guard – Soldier Wren is on guard duty in a dangerous combat zone. 
However, the night has been relatively uneventful up until this point, and she 
has caught herself falling asleep twice, but managed to shake herself awake. She 
falls asleep, leaving the compound unguarded (296-297).
Sher contends that in each of these cases, the agents are morally responsible 
for their lapses of attention, but contends that their lapses of attention were not 
in their control because they were not freely chosen.
At first glance, each of these cases might look like an instance of resultant 
moral luck, or luck in the consequences of their actions; Alessandra for her dog’s 
sickness, Julian for the crashed ferry, and Wren for leaving the base unguarded. 
But surely this is not the case; to illustrate this consider the following case:
1a. Unattended Infant – Alessandra, with her infant daughter Bathsheba2 in the 
back of her van, leaves to pick up her other children from school as usual. In 
the past, the pickup has never taken long, and, as usual, Alessandra leaves her 
infant daughter unattended in the van. While picking up her children, Ales-
sandra is distracted by a school matter for several hours, and forgets about her 
daughter.
Independent of whatever happens to Bathsheba2, and how long Alessan-
dra spends in the school, Alessandra’s choice to leave her infant daughter un-
attended in her van for any length of time is prima facie morally appalling! 
What’s worse, this is business as usual for Alessandra! Now, to be fair, we 
could construct a state of affairs to precede this case such that Alessandra 
would be entirely morally blameless for making such a free choice; she could 
be genuinely, almost unbelievably ignorant about the dangers of leaving in-
fants unattended in hot, enclosed spaces, let alone about the dangers of people 
who might want to kidnap such infants. Where she so ignorant, I contend 
Alessandra would be prima facie morally blameless, although she would still 
be a rather unfit mother.
let us suppose, though, that Alessandra is not so unbelievably ignorant. let 
us stipulate that she is well aware of the dangers of leaving her infant daughter 
in the van, the risk she is taking of kidnapping and bodily harm to Bathsheba2, 
so forth and so on. Furthermore, let us stipulate that she is not mentally ill, psy-
chologically traumatized, nor does she have any other impairments that might 
lead us to excuse her behavior in virtue of her incompetence or incompleteness 
as a moral agent. For the sake of brevity, let us make these stipulations with 
regards to the rest of Sher’s 9 cases as well – Sher’s agents are neither atypically 
ignorant, nor are they incompetent.
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When Alessandra freely chooses to leave her daughter unattended on mul-
tiple occasions, she can be understood as expressly consenting to the unnec-
essary risk to her daughter’s safety and health. While there may be situations 
where such risk is worth taking, I’m at a loss to see what benefit this would 
bring in this case other than Alessandra’s convenience. This strikes me as an 
indefensible choice the first time she makes it, and an indefensible choice to 
keep making (although, arguably, after each uneventful risk, Alessandra is 
given a small bit of data that suggests it is less risky).
The morally abhorrent aspect of Unattended Infant is, I think, comparable 
to the morally abhorrent aspect of Hot Dog. This is not to say that infants and 
dogs are morally comparable, but what Alessandra consents to in regards the 
risks to Bathsheba is comparable to the risks she consents to in regards to 
Bathsheba2 – risks to health and safety. Admittedly, an unhealthy dog is not 
as big a risk as an unhealthy child, but unless one takes the view that animals 
are not morally relevant, the risks Alessandra takes in Hot Dog are still morally 
relevant and morally abhorrent. I think is it obvious that what Alessandra is 
truly morally responsible for in this case is taking these risks which could be 
easily avoided (by, say, leaving the dog at home).
Sher contends that Alessandra is morally culpable for the consequences 
of her forgetting that she brought her dog with her. While things might have 
turned out better had she not forgotten, this doesn’t matter for the analysis of 
the risk she freely and knowledgably consents to. What is prima facie morally 
abhorrent about these cases is that Alessandra consents to leave her dog and/
or infant alone in the car at all given her beliefs about the strong possibility of 
harm she is risking. That she thought she would risk only a few minutes, rather 
than several hours, is irrelevant to the question of the scope of her responsibil-
ity. Alessandra might be supplementarily morally blameworthy for failing to 
take the psychological steps to remember that she left her dog in peril, but this 
blameworthiness is relatively minor when compared to her blameworthiness for 
risking her dog’s health and safety in the first place.
Similarly, it strikes me that if Julian is appropriately concerned about the 
risk posed by the rocks, and competently aware of the likeliness with which 
he might become distracted, he has a strong moral obligation to take precau-
tions – to set a timer, alarm clock, or just pay someone to walk up to him and 
slap him in the face forty minutes in. As with Alessandra, if we attribute nearly 
unbelievable, atypical beliefs to Julian, we might come to the conclusion he is 
entirely morally blameless; if Julian is genuinely ignorant about the extent to 
which a romantic encounter might distract him, he might not have known that 
he needed to take precautions, and would be prima facie morally blameless in 
such a bizarre case.
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let us stipulate that Wren is competent, and has been trained in methods 
to prevent herself from falling asleep in situations like the one she faces. She 
apparently freely chooses to ignore her training, and risks leaving the base 
unguarded. It is this free choice that is morally abhorrent. If her falling asleep 
was genuinely outside of her control, such as the result of extreme exhaustion 
on the job or a psychological disorder she had previously shared with her com-
manding officer, or if she genuinely tried every method she knew to stay awake 
to stave off her third departure into dreamland to no effect, Wren would be 
blameless. But this, again, is a radical departure from the case we’re given. 
2.2 Case Group (4-6) – Bad Judgment
In each of these cases, Sher believes the agent act in a blameworthy manner 
because they “exercise poor judgment” (288). each of these cases is also an ap-
parent case of moral resultant luck.
4. Home for the Holidays – Joliet, home alone and desperately afraid of burglars, 
hears a sound in the kitchen below. She grabs her gun, sneaks downstairs, and 
shoots the intruder... her son, home early for the holidays.
5. Colicky Baby – Scout, 23 years old, is watching her sister’s baby, who has been 
crying for hours. She has tried everything she can think of to ease its discomfort, 
but nothing has worked. Finally, she mixes vodka with the child’s fruit juice, 
and feeds it to her. The baby is rushed to the hospital with alcohol poisoning.
6. Jackknife – Father Poteet is a “good driver”, and attempts to enter a busy free-
way. Competing with an eighteen-wheeler on the highway for the low-lane, Poteet 
chooses to speed ahead, rather than stop abruptly, but doesn’t give the trucker 
enough room; causing his truck to jackknife and seriously hurt many people (288).
Sher’s second set is a mixed bag; he contends that none of the agents has 
“chosen to do anything that he thinks is wrong or to harm any innocent per-
son” (288). On the assumption these agents are competent and has the faintest 
glimmer of commonsense, surely this is not the case! Both Scout and Father 
Poteet willfully engage in activities they are thus stipulated to know risk harm 
to innocent people.
Sher contends that “Scout should have tried to find out whether babies can 
tolerate alcohol” (293). This strikes me as a bizarre claim to make. let us stipu-
late that Scout is neither atypically ignorant of the effects of alcohol on infants, 
nor atypically ignorant of the general frailty of infants. If both of these are true, it 
is unconceivable that Scout could act as she did without knowing that she is risk-
ing the baby’s health and life. Perhaps Sher conceived of Scout as a person who 
got her limited child-rearing skills from bad situation comedies, but this makes 
Scout out to be so ignorant and incompetent as to suggest that she is entirely 
morally blameless for her actions! However, we’re told Scout is 23, so I suspect 
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we’re supposed to think that Scout has at least the same familiarity with alcohol 
as any high school or college student. To the extent that Scout is trusted to watch 
her sister’s child, we’re also left to assume that she is at least superficially aware 
of the frailty of children. Given both of these assumptions, Scout’s choice to give 
alcohol to her sister’s baby is expressly consenting to an unreasonable risk for the 
personal gain of stopping the child from crying. Prima facie morally abhorrent.
We’re told Poteet is a good driver; he is not. Driving is dangerous, and one 
should err on the side of caution. let us stipulate that Poteet has not experi-
enced an atypical brain event, or the extreme degradation of his senses or men-
tal faculties, and stipulate that Poteet has at least the kind of knowledge one 
gets from driver’s education. He knows that eighteen-wheelers are particularly 
dangerous vehicles, and that it is best to be extra cautious around them.
Sher would have us believe that Poteet misjudged whether he had room 
to merge, and that he is morally responsible for the accident as a result. The 
problem with this view is that we’ve stipulated that Poteet is aware that the 
situation dictates caution. Poteet knows to give eighteen-wheelers substantial 
leeway; sufficient leeway such that if Poteet made a foreseeable error in judging 
the distance he had available, the error would have been insufficient to cause 
an accident. By stipulation, Poteet’s senses and judgment are working such that 
had he given the truck what he believed was an appropriate amount of leeway, 
there would have been no accident. While Sher contends the accident can be 
traced to Poteet’s error in judging distance, I contend that it is properly traced 
back to Poteet’s free willingness to take an unacceptable risk. Poteet knew to 
give eighteen-wheelers a wide margin, yet freely gave the eighteen-wheeler a 
much less comfortable margin of error. As luck has it, he then erred. Poteet 
willfully risked the lives of others for what? To get on the highway faster?
Suppose Poteet’s error in judgment was atypical; that he genuinely believed 
that he gave the eighteen-wheeler a sufficient room, and he ended up being 
wrong. In such a case, it would be inappropriate to hold Poteet morally re-
sponsible for the accident, to the extent that his error in judgment was caused 
by an atypical and unexpected brain event, or a massive failure of his senses or 
spatial judgment. The difference between this case and Sher’s is in this case, 
Poteet is not negligent. If we stipulate Poteet is competent, that his spatial 
reasoning is reliable, and that he knows to give eighteen-wheelers substantial 
leeway, his negligence in Sher’s case is clear.
The oddest case of this bunch is Home for the Holidays, where Sher con-
tends that Joliet should have investigated further before shooting the person 
who let themselves into her home without her permission, and that she is 
blameworthy as a result. This is absurd! Joliet shooting her son is a tragedy, 
but we don’t have any indication that Joliet was unfairly panicked, or irratio-
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nally afraid. Sher clearly intends the reader to interpret Joliet as genuinely 
believing she was shooting a burglar.
For the purposes of this case, assume that it is morally acceptable to shoot 
intruders. In the Second Treatise, John locke argued that it is morally accept-
able to kill thieves because if they demonstrate their willingness to violate your 
property right, you have no reason to suppose they wouldn’t take away your 
liberty or your life as well.3 Joliet’s safety and continued wellbeing depends 
upon her shooting any burglars before they have the opportunity to notice her 
and take her life first, and as such the action of shooting what one believes to 
be a burglar is prima facie morally acceptable.
What is bizarre about this case is not Joliet’s actions, but her son’s. let us 
assume Joliet’s son is reasonably familiar with his mother’s character, such that 
he knows she is afraid of burglars and has been known to chase down noises 
with a shotgun in the middle of the night. By entering the house without warn-
ing, Joliet’s son has risked his own life; the outcome of him being shot by his 
mother is a foreseeable, and by stipulation foreseen, consequence of his ac-
tions, yet he (apparently) freely chooses this course of action anyways! This is 
prima facie morally blameworthy behavior because it can lead to the sorts of 
consequences that it actually lead to!
Consider the following case:
4a. The Burglar – Joliet, home alone and desperately afraid of burglars, hears a 
sound in the kitchen below. She grabs her gun, sneaks downstairs, and spots an 
intruder. It is the middle of the summer and she has no relatives expected for 
a visit, but Joliet has heard tales of people accidentally shooting loved ones. In 
fact, her Christmas card each year includes a passionate plea that carolers and 
people who visit call ahead of time so that she can be sure not to shoot them 
by accident. Still, weary of such mistakes, Joliet lurks in the shadows for a few 
moments until she is sure the intruder is a burglar; but the burglar is armed and 
has spotted her! 
In this case, Joliet acts as Sher believes she should have, cautiously, and as 
a result risks her life. Joliet hasn’t rushed to judgment, or exercised poor judg-
ment; she is a victim here. Despite the bad consequences, Joliet is prima facie 
praiseworthy for her actions – she took all necessary and reasonable steps to 
protect her life.
 3  John locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter laslett (Cambridge, 1960), Book II, 
Chapter Three, Section 18.
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2.3 (7-9) Moral Ignorance
In the next three cases Sher contends the agents in question freely perform 
actions which are, in fact, wrong, but are ignorant of their wrongness because 
they lack “some form of moral insight or imagination” (290). In each of these 
cases, Sher believes the agent is morally culpable for the bad results of their ac-
tions; Sher would apparently classify these as moral resultant luck despite the 
wrong-making characteristic of the actions being the direct result of a charac-
ter flaw, what would otherwise be characterized as constitutive luck.
7. Bad Joke – Ryland is self-absorbed and oblivious to the effect of her actions on 
others. She tells a joke belittling a childless couple, handicapped person, and 
financial failure to an audience that includes a childless couple, a handicapped 
person, and a financial failure. The audience disapproves, and Ryland notices.
8. Bad Policy – When Sylvain’s students request extra-credit, he puts himself in 
their position and often concludes extra credit is justified and approves it, but 
he forgets to make the same offer of extra credit to his class as a whole, leading 
to inconsistent and unfair grading.
9. Bad Weather – It is 1968 and Adam has engaged in a reflective equilibrium about 
his moral beliefs, and has come to the conclusion that capitalism is extremely 
morally unjust, and that the best means to combat capitalism is to begin a revo-
lution. Adam participates in a bank robbery with his revolutionaries in which a 
bank guard is killed.
Sher believes that each of the agents in these cases is morally culpable for 
the results that emerge from some deficiency in their moral reasoning. How-
ever, in most of these cases Sher depicts the agents as almost unbelievably 
ignorant; ignorance that would under normal circumstances absolve them of 
moral blameworthiness.
Sher seems to think it is appropriate to blame Ryland for hurting the feel-
ings of others with her joke, but surely this is the least of our concerns in this 
case. Ryland’s choices are without malice, a result of her having prima facie 
vicious character traits. either Ryland came to have these traits in a manner in 
which was in her control, or one that was outside of her control. If the latter, 
she is like Francine and blameless. If the former, either she knew her actions 
would bring about undesirable consequences, like Janine1, and is blamewor-
thy; or she was ignorant of the fact that her actions would bring about undesir-
able consequences, and intuitively blameless.
What riles us up about Ryland is that it is rather hard to imagine that one 
can come to be so self-absorbed without freely and expressly committing one-
self to the position that one is morally superior to others, a belief that is not 
supported by the facts.
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This case is meant to show that Ryland has evidence that she is out of touch, 
but Sher contends that she is bewildered by the audience response, suggesting 
that she genuinely doesn’t know what she did wrong. It makes sense to say 
that Ryland might be morally obligated, in response to her critics, to find out 
what they believe she has done wrong, and try to change her behavior in the 
future, but it strikes me as incoherent to say that she is blameworthy simply 
for her ignorance, unless it is willful ignorance. Of course we’re inclined to say 
that she should know better. But this just is to say that in the past Ryland had 
appropriate opportunity and motivation to come to know what the right thing 
to do in this situation was, and freely, negligently, and blameworthily chose to 
do otherwise. 
Sylvain’s case is similarly bizarre. Sher contends Sylvain is missing moral 
knowledge; however, surely what Sylvain is morally responsible for is either 
giving extra credit when it is unjustified, or for unfairly distributing justified 
extra credit, the latter of which is the result of his repeated forgetfulness on 
the matter.
For the purposes of this discussion, let extra-credit be any credit that con-
tributes to a student’s grade outside of the original syllabus. The commonsense 
justification of extra-credit is that the existing grade-scale is insufficient to ade-
quately judge a student’s progress in a course. In such cases, giving extra-credit 
is a means of pursuing fairness. 
Suppose a student approaches Sylvain and asks for extra-credit, and gives a 
persuasive argument why Sylvain’s grade apparatus is insufficient to accurately 
judge a student’s progress. Sylvain then constructs an extra-credit assignment 
and gives it to that student. I’ve previously stipulated the competence of the 
agents in Sher’s cases, so in light of this stipulation, Sylvain knows he ought to 
inform the class of the extra-credit assignment. Sher contends that the reason 
Sylvain doesn’t do so is that he is forgetful, but this ignores a deeper prob-
lem – Sylvain apparently freely consented to give the student who brought 
the issue to his attention more time to complete the assignment than the rest 
of the class. There are two prima facie morally wrong events that occur here, 
first, Sylvian freely chooses to give one student an unfair advantage on extra-
credit, and second, Sylvain has come to the conclusion that he ought to offer 
extra-credit to his entire class, and fails to do so because he forgets and keeps 
on forgetting! If Sylvain is aware of his chronic forgetfulness, surely he has 
methods of reminding himself what to talk about in class – for exaple, lecture 
notes. In light of this, Sylvain apparently freely chooses to give students unfair 
advantages, and additionally freely chooses not to bother reminding himself 
to give the opportunity to each of his students; both of which are prima facie 
morally blameworthy.
 IN CONTROl 71
Sher, too, offers two accounts of Sylvain’s wrongdoing in this case; first that 
“Sylvain is too focused on the individual before him to realize that he is being 
unfair to others” and second “Sylvain should have reflected before agreeing to 
allow his student to earn extra credit” (290, 293). Regarding the first, if Sher 
means to stipulate that Sylvain has a mental deficiency that prevents him from 
realizing there are other students in his course whom he has to treat fairly when 
dealing with students one on one, this doesn’t suggest that Sylvain is morally 
blameworthy, only that he is poorly equipped to be a teacher. Sher’s second claim 
is more substantial, but I think inconsistent with the case; Sylvain might be too 
sympathetic to his students, such that he is easily persuaded by arguments he 
ought not be convinced by, but he is decision to give extra credit is based on his 
belief at the time that his syllabus is inadequate. It is fair to question whether Syl-
vain’s conclusion is justified, but instead Sher contends that Sylvain just doesn’t 
bother to deliberate on the issue, which is directly contradicted by the case. 
It’s hard to interpret Sher’s final case as anything but an intuition pump. 
Adam freely chooses to engage in a violent revolution to unseat what he sees as 
a great evil, yet Sher seems to focus on the fact that the first step in this bloody 
conflict results in an unintentional death of a bank guard! Whether Adam is 
prima facie praiseworthy or blameworthy, I think, stands or falls on whether or 
not his conclusion that capitalism is a great evil worthy of revolution is morally 
justified. Consider this case:
9a. Nazis! – It is 1939 and Adam2 has engaged in a reflective equilibrium about his 
moral beliefs, and has come to the conclusion that the fascist Nazi government 
in his home country of Germany is extremely morally unjust, and that the best 
means to combat it is to begin a revolution. Adam2 participates in raid against a 
government run military institution in which a guard is killed.
Although we might be quick to jump to the conclusion that Adam is morally 
blameworthy, it strikes me we would be equally quick to jump to the conclusion 
that Adam2 is morally praiseworthy. The explanation for why we believe the 
latter is praiseworthy, and the former blameless is that we agree with their con-
clusions! Whether these agents are morally justified in their actions stands or 
falls on whether their moral deliberation was justified or not. If we stipulate that 
to the best of his knowledge, Adam2 had no reason to conclude that Nazi Ger-
many was corrupt, but came to this conclusion through selfishness, willful inat-
tention to detail, or negligence in his moral calculations, surely Adam2 would be 
blameworthy; similarly if Adam’s choice in Bad Weather is the result of morally 
corrupt or negligent reflective equilibrium, he is blameworthy for that.
Sher contends that Adam is morally culpable for his “defective judging” that 
occurs during his reflective equilibrium, and that he has a character that is “in 
72 WIllIAM SIMkuleT 
some respect worse than normal” (291, 298). It’s not clear what about Adam’s 
judgment or character Sher finds defective – he disagrees with Adam about 
whether and how bad capitalism is, or he disagrees that violent revolution is the 
appropriate reaction, or both. Sher takes it for granted that we disagree with 
Adam’s conclusion, and leaves it at that. Rather than point to some faulty aspect 
of Adam’s judgment or character, Sher simply states, but does not stipulate, that 
Adam’s judgment on the matter is impaired and character is faulty. Aside from 
disagreeing with his conclusions though, Sher gives us no reason to think this!
It is far outside the scope of either this or Sher’s paper whether capitalism is 
a morally acceptable system and whether violent revolution is an acceptable re-
sponse to it if it were not. However, it is, I think, worth offering a plausible set 
of beliefs that could lead Adam to come to such a conclusion. Suppose Adam 
is a strong lockean. earlier, when discussing whether Joliet exhibited the ap-
propriate caution in Home for the Holidays, I offered a lockean justification for 
killing in self defense. locke argues that we have a moral obligation to protect 
humanity and to punish wrongdoers, an obligation we largely charge the state 
with enforcing. If the state fails, though, this obligation is said to revert to us. 
The private ownership of goods means that private owners are legally justified 
in withholding access to said goods, even if doing so is expected to lead to the 
suffering and death of innocent human beings. Suppose Adam was confronted 
with many situations like this, where opportunists with a local monopoly on 
life-saving food and medicine took advantage of a natural disaster to gouge 
sick and hungry citizens, and often refused to sell goods to victims with a lack 
of funds, letting them die despite the fact they had a prima facie moral obliga-
tion to protect them. Furthermore, suppose Adam tried to get government to 
step in, and got nowhere. even in 1968, laws allowed corporations to have sub-
stantial political influence; problematic as corporations are understood to have 
a moral obligation to pursue what’s in the financial interest of its shareholders, 
not the best interest of the citizenry as a whole. In light of his experiences 
and moral commitments, it strikes me that Adam might very well come to the 
moral revelation that the existing government is shirking it’s moral responsibil-
ity, that capitalists are negligent in their moral obligations, and that he, Adam, 
has a prima facie moral obligation to act as he did.
We might just as easily explain Adam’s conclusion as resulting from morally 
negligent reflective equilibrium. Perhaps eve is a member of a terrorist organi-
zation determined to overthrow capitalism, and Adam is particularly interest-
ed in eve. Rather than engage in a serious and heartfelt reflective equilibrium, 
he glares deeply in eve’s eyes as she explains her position, and lovestruckly 
replies “I completely agree”. In this case, surely Adam acts negligently, and 
thus would be morally culpable.
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Now, it would be absurd to suggest that it would be inappropriate to judge 
Adam blameworthy in this case, but whether or not Adam is actually blame-
worthy depends upon states of affairs that Sher is strangely silent on when 
constructing the case. Sher is all over the place on what he contends Adam 
is blameworthy for – faulty judgment, vicious character; Sher even says that 
Adam “sounds like he has lost his moral compass” (291, 298, 294). However, 
I’ve argued that Adam is genuinely blameworthy if and only if he engages in his 
reflective equilibrium in a negligent manner. In light of the general acceptance 
of capitalism, we have good reason to believe Adam ought to have come to a 
different conclusion, and thus have good reason to judge him blameworthy for 
hypothetical negligence; however if Adam’s reflective equilibrium is not negli-
gent, then he is prima facie praiseworthy for his actions.
Sher contends that each of the agents from his cases are uncontroversially 
morally blameworthy for actions they “cannot help” but perform (285). He 
says, “The gist of the discussion so far is that agents often seem responsible for 
wrong acts that they have neither knowingly chosen to perform nor knowingly 
and wrongfully chosen to risk performing” (295). 
Above, I’ve argued that this is not the case, unless one chooses to assume the 
agents in question are generally incompetent (and if one makes this assump-
tion, they ought to be committed to the proposition that their incompetence 
absolves them of either praise or blame). In the cases where the agents are 
blameworthy, they are so because they consent to engage in negligent or risky 
behavior. Alessandra unduly regularly risks her dog’s safety and all but once 
she gets lucky and the dog is safe, Julian risks crashing his ferry into rocks 
because he fails to ensure he is appropriately prepared to deal with his danger-
ous route, Wren willfully and negligently fails to take the steps necessary to 
keep herself awake on guard duty, Scout willfully risks her sister’s baby’s life 
to stop the baby’s crying, Poteet regularly fails to give eighteen-wheelers ap-
propriate leeway on the highway, Ryland ignores the interests and welfare of 
others, Sylvain repeatedly and unjustly distributes assignments without regard 
to fairness, and Adam negligently comes to the conclusion that capitalism is 
not only wrong, but so morally abhorrent that it must be opposed through 
violent revolution. 
All 9 cases share one thing in common, Sher believes they are cases of moral 
resultant luck; where Sher would hold these agents blameworthy for Alessan-
dra’s dog’s health, Julian’s crash, Wren’s leaving the base unguarded, Scout’s 
sister’s baby’s poisoning, Poteet’s accident, the feelings Ryland’s joke hurt, Syl-
vain’s unjust grading, the death of a prima facie innocent bank guard in Adam’s 
robbery, and the death of Joliet’s son. In all but the case of Joliet, it strikes me 
that these agents are at best derivatively morally blameworthy for the results 
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Sher finds blameworthy, and genuinely responsible instead for the unnecessary 
risks and negligence they engage in.
Sher contends that we are unable to locate the wrongness of these agent’s 
actions is choices the agents knowingly engaged in while believing they were 
wrong (297). Instead he contends that these agents “have exercised control in 
the sense that the wrongness of their acts and omissions can be traced to sets 
of beliefs, desires, and so forth, not all of which are conscious but all of which 
are fully their own”. This analysis strikes me as a mistake; surely Alessandra 
doesn’t believe that this time she risks her dog’s life, that it will have negative 
consequences, and Poteet doesn’t believe that this time he attempts to merge 
without giving the truck a wide birth he’ll cause an accident; but if we stipulate 
these agents are well informed and in control of their faculties, they know there 
is a notable possibility that their actions will cause such harm and devastation 
and yet freely ignore this possibility and act anyways. If we stipulate they are 
fools, the question becomes, then, why they are such fools. I contend that if we 
trace their foolishness back to something that is outside of their control, they’re 
intuitively not responsible for their actions. Francine is a danger to herself and 
others, but no more morally responsible for her actions than a plague victim for 
the risk she poses to the health of the community. Sher seems genuinely indif-
ferent about this intuition, instead contending that in those cases that where an 
agent acts in a blameworthy fashion despite lacking the belief that their action 
is blameworthy, they are still blameworthy because their actions are caused by 
the beliefs and desires that make them the persons that they are (298). In this 
regard, his view is not so different from Adams view; people who have morally 
undesirable character traits through no fault of their own are themselves not 
only morally undesirable, insofar as you don’t want to spend time with them, 
but are actually morally blameworthy, such that it would make sense to punish 
them for an eternity in hell for who they are!
On Sher’s view, if scientists programmed Francine to be a mindless killing 
machine, and executed her the moment she is released from her vat, she is 
morally responsible because of the beliefs and desires, conscious or not, that 
make her who she is. If Sher means she that she is truly morally responsible, 
I suppose we’re supposed to think it would be fitting for her to be endlessly 
tortured in hell for all of eternity for being who she is, alongside that lemon of 
a car that was just no good. This is absurd.
Alternatively, perhaps when Sher discusses “moral responsibility”, he means 
“practical responsibility”; Francine is blameworthy for being who she is in the 
same way a plague victim is, or a lemon of an automobile is, or an untamed 
lion, tiger, or bear is. They are “blameworthy” in the sense that they are un-
desirable; that you just don’t want them around. However, unless I’m vastly 
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ignorant about a whole swath of philosophical literature about how it is practi-
cal and in your interest to hang around with plague victim, faulty automobiles, 
untamed carnivores, and people who are wholly causally determined to do 
things that they believe are morally right, but have uncontroversially horrible 
consequences... this is not a matter that is contention. But this is not a matter 
of moral responsibility, nor is it particularly insightful.
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